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The Dawes Plan in Operation*
By Joseph E. Sterrett

The Dawes Plan has been in operation for less than three years,
but even this brief space of time has been sufficient to create a
sort of legend which obscures in many minds the deeper meaning
and purpose of the Plan. In considering what the fruits of the
Plan have been and some of its possible implications for the
future, it is desirable to reexamine briefly the historical setting
of the Plan and also to restate its purposes and some of the means
by which it was hoped those purposes might be attained.
From the signing of the Peace Treaty of Versailles in June of
1919, reparations became the central economic problem in Euro
pean affairs. Nothing could be settled until the reparation
problem was solved and, instead of being left for settlement by an
independent body who could view it as a business problem, it
became the football of both national and international politics.
Conference followed conference and the situation grew steadily
worse. The Reparation Commission, representing the Allied
Governments, made demands upon Germany for reparation
payments, and in the earlier days succeeded in collecting sub
stantial amounts. These demands, however, were not based
upon a scientific study of Germany’s ability to pay and had little
regard to their effect upon the German economy. Not only in
Germany but in the Allied countries as well, reparations were at
least a contributing factor in the dislocation of the currencies.
In consequence of currency conditions, especially those in
Germany, business had no assured basis and every transaction
which involved the factor of time had in it necessarily a large
element of speculation. At the end, Germany was prostrated, its
currency became practically worthless, one gold mark being
equal to a trillion paper marks. Reparations were not being
* An address delivered at the annual meeting of the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America, Washington, D. C., May 3, 1927.
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paid, and what looked like an interminable deadlock was stran
gling Germany and doing vast injury to the Allied nations. An
effort had been made to collect reparations by force but the
principal result was a crop of deep bitterness.
By one of the greatest of modern miracles, Germany, in the
midst of this situation, stabilized its currency late in the year
1923. The rentenmark, as the new currency was called, had a
value equivalent to the old mark. It had no gold backing, but
merely a mortgage upon the land, and to some extent upon
personal property; yet in spite of this, the German people had a
measure of confidence in this new currency sufficient to enable its
equilibrium to be maintained. Obviously, however, this equi
librium could not have been continued for long without some kind
of a settlement of the reparation problem and without the help
of a foreign loan. Demands by the Allies for payments on ac
count of reparation might, and probably would, have placed a
burden upon the German budget which would have again started
the dreary round of inflation.
It was at this point in December, 1923, that the Reparation
Commission appointed two Committees, the first of which, soon
known as the Dawes Committee, was “entrusted with considering
the means of balancing the budget and the measures to be taken
to stabilize the currency” of Germany. The other Committee
was to “consider the means of estimating the amount of exported
capital and to bring it back into Germany.” The work of this
second Committee was done with careful thoroughness and its
report is a valuable one. It, however, does not form part of the
subject which we are now discussing and is therefore merely
mentioned in passing.
The First Committee of Experts, as it is technically known,
was presided over by General Dawes, and most of us remember
the eager interest with which its report was received in April,
1924. The spirit of the report is indicated by its Chairman in his
letter transmitting the report to the Reparation Commission.
In that letter he said:
“ Deeply impressed by a sense of its responsibility to your Commission
and to the universal conscience, the Committee bases its plan upon those
principles of justice, fairness and mutual interest, in the supremacy of
which not only the creditors of Germany and Germany herself, but the
world, has a vital and enduring concern.
“With these principles fixed and accepted in that common good faith
which is the foundation of all business, and the best safeguard for universal
peace, the recommendations of the Committee must be considered not as
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inflicting penalties, but as suggesting means for assisting the economic
recovery of all the European peoples and the entry upon a new period of
happiness and prosperity unmenaced by war.”

As evidencing its attitude toward the problem which had been
submitted to it, the Committee, in its report, said:
“ We have approached our task as business men anxious to obtain effec
tive results. We have been concerned with the technical, and not the
political, aspects of the problem presented to us. We have recognized
indeed that political considerations necessarily set certain limits within
which a solution must be found if it is to have any chance of acceptance.
To this extent, and to this extent only, we have borne them in mind. . . .
“ As regards past history, it has not seemed necessary to establish the
causes, nor the responsibility for those causes, which have operated to
produce the present state of German finances and currency, except in so
far as a recognition of their character is required for the prescription of
remedies.
“ Finally, convinced as we are, that it is hopeless to build any construc
tive scheme unless this finds its own guarantee in the fact that it is to the
interest of all the parties to carry it out in good faith, we put forward our
plan relying upon this interest.”

It will be observed that the First Committee was charged with
the duty of finding means of stabilizing the German currency and
balancing the German budget. These objects had to be attained
in the light of Germany’s reparation obligations. Indeed, as the
Committee said, “The dominating feature of the German budget
is Germany’s obligation to the Allies under the Treaty of Ver
sailles.” Consequently, any plan under which the German
budget could be balanced and the stability of the currency assured,
had to specify a definite basis for determining the reparation
burden upon the German economy. Upon this point the Com
mittee was emphatic; “We desire to make it quite clear that the
sums denoted above in our examination of the successive years,
comprise all amounts for which Germany may be liable to the
Allied and Associated powers for the costs arising out of the war
including reparation, restitution, all costs of all armies of occupa
tion,” and all other similar charges. This is the so called “allinclusive” feature of the annuities provided under the Plan. By
it the maximum annual burden upon Germany is definitely limited.
It is one of the principal safeguards of the German budget and of
the German currency.
The annuities started at 1,000 million gold marks for the first
year, which began on September 1, 1924, and will increase each
year until the fifth year, beginning on September 1, 1928, when
the maximum, or standard, annuity of 2,500 million gold marks is
to be reached. All payments made by Germany on account of
these annuities are paid in gold marks, or their equivalent in
403
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German currency, into the Reichsbank to the credit of the Agent
General for Reparation Payments; in the language of the Ex
perts’ Report, “This payment is the definitive act of the German
Government in meeting its financial obligations under the Plan.’’
The funds necessary to meet these annuities are derived in part
from the interest and the sinking fund on the eleven milliards of
Germany railway bonds and from the interest and the sinking
fund upon the five milliards of industrial debentures. These
obligations are secured by a mortgage upon the German railways
and by a somewhat similar lien upon the industrial establishments
of the country. Another substantial part of the annuity is
derived from the yield of the transport tax levied upon the trans
portation of goods and passengers in Germany. The remainder of
each annuity is a direct charge upon the German budget and is
secured by the so-called controlled revenues, that is, the yield
from the taxes on customs, alcohol, tobacco, beer and sugar.
During the present or third annuity year, this direct charge upon
the budget represents one-fifth of the total annuity. It increases,
however, until in the fifth or standard year it will constitute onehalf of the annuity.
It is the aim of the Plan to place upon Germany the responsi
bility for the raising of these funds and the paying of them into
the Reichsbank. There is only a minimum amount of foreign
control. The Reichsbank has seven foreign members out of
fourteen upon its general Council; one of the foreign members
acts as a Commissioner and is in control of the note issue. There
are at present four foreign out of the fourteen members of the
German Railway Board and a foreign Commissioner who has
broad powers in the event of a default; and there is a foreign trus
tee for the railway bonds. There are seven foreign out of the
fifteen members of the Board of the Bank for German Industrial
Debentures; and there is also a foreign Commissioner. In the
case of the controlled revenues there is a foreign Commissioner who
has general supervision over the administration of these revenues
and he also has substantial authority in the event of default.
It was, however, a deliberate aim of the Experts Committee to
interfere as little as was consistent with proper protection with
the functioning of the German Government. Throughout the
operation of the Plan this principle has been adhered to with care.
As has been observed, the obligation of Germany under the
Plan is to pay in German currency, to the Agent General for Rep
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The Dawes Plan in Operation
aration Payments, a stipulated annuity, and having done that
her obligation is discharged; she is not responsible for the transfer
of this German currency to the creditor Governments. The
Experts Committee, in its report upon this point, said:
"````There has been a tendency in the past to confuse two distinct though
related questions, i. e., first the amount of revenue which Germany can
raise available for reparation account, and, second, the amount which can
be transferred to foreign countries. . . . We propose to distinguish
sharply between the two problems, and first deal with the problem of the
maximum budget surplus and afterwards with the problem of payment to
the Allies.”

Reference has been made already to what the Committee did in
regard to the first of these problems. Taking up in due course the
second question, the Committee decided that the use and with
drawal of the monies deposited in the Reichsbank to the credit of
the Agent General for Reparation Payments should be controlled
by a Committee, known as the Transfer Committee, which
consists of the Agent General for Reparation Payments as Chair
man and five other members appointed by the Reparation Com
mission, one each from America, France, Great Britain, Italy and
Belgium. In the language of the report:
44 This Committee will regulate the execution of the programme for de
liveries in kind and the payments under the Reparation Recovery Act, in
such a manner as to prevent difficulties arising with the foreign exchange.
44 They will also control the transfer of cash to the Allies by purchase of
foreign exchange and generally so act as to secure the maximum transfers,
without bringing about instability of currency.”

The Committee is given broad powers under the Plan and, except
in the event of certain rather remote contingencies, its judgment
upon any question within its field is final. With regard to the
relative importance of the transfer part of the reparation problem,
the Experts stated:
44 We are convinced that some kind of coordinated policy with continu
ous expert administration in regard to the exchange, lies at the root of the
reparation problem and is essential to any practicable scheme in obtaining
the maximum sums from Germany for the benefit of the Allies.”

In his report of November 30,1926, the Agent General in speaking
of the Transfer Committee, said:
"The Transfer Committee is thus charged with the duty, on the one
hand, of providing the maximum possible amount of transfers to the
creditor Powers, and, on the other, of protecting the stability of the
German exchange. In discharging this heavy responsibility the Com
mittee must naturally look to the terms of the Plan and the London Agree
ments, but it has at the same time the cardinal advantage of complete
independence of thought and action. The members of the Committee
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are not open to instructions from any quarter, and in the discharge of
their duties under the Plan are always free to act according to their own
best judgment.”

Enough has been said to indicate the general outline of the Plan
and the organization which has been set up to administer it.
It may, however, be added at this point, that the German Gov
ernment has faithfully and promptly fulfilled its obligations under
the Plan. There have been a number of questions, any one of
which would have been quite sufficient to have caused a quarrel,
had it not been that both the German Government and the or
ganization charged with the administration of the Plan, were
imbued with a willingness to agree; and these questions, as they
arose, were taken up, as business problems usually are, for dis
cussion in a spirit of mutual confidence and a desire to find some
acceptable method of accommodation.
Turning next to a brief survey of what has been accomplished
under the Plan, the financial results may be mentioned first, not
merely because of their own intrinsic importance, but also be
cause their success has favorably influenced other and more
intangible results which, when an ultimate appraisement can
be made, may well be found to be the Plan’s greatest contribution
to the post-war settlement. The annuity for the first year
amounted to 1,000 millions of gold marks and that for the second
year 1,220 millions of gold marks, while the annuity for the third
year, now current, is 1,500 millions of gold marks. On account of
these annuities, and including certain minor items of interest and
exchange, there was actually received by the Agent General
within the two and one-half years to February 28, 1927, a total
of 2,732 millions of gold marks. The interest and sinking fund
of the industrial debentures are payable in semi-annual instal
ments and other items, such as the transport tax, cannot be de
termined in amount until some days after the close of the period.
It will be understood, therefore, that it is impracticable for the
entire amount of each annuity to be in bank before the close of
business on the last day of the period.
The disbursements in the first year were 897 millions of gold
marks and in the second year 1,183 millions and for the first six
months of the third year they were 528 millions, making a total
of 2,608 millions. The remaining balance of 124 millions of
gold marks does not indicate any difficulty in transfer but is a
necessary working balance with which to meet drafts under
406
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contracts, of which there is always outstanding a substantial
amount, and other forms of transfer payments the totals of which
necessarily vary as between months. Emphasis is laid upon this
minor point because there has been a mistaken belief in some
quarters that reparation funds have been accumulating in the
hands of the Agent General.
Out of each annuity there must be paid several items, in the
nature of prior charges, before distribution can be made to the
creditor Powers. One of the most important of these items is that
of the service of the German External Loan of 1924 and there are
other items covering the expenses of the various inter-allied com
missions, such as the Inter-allied Rhineland High Commission,
the Military Commission of Control, which has now ceased to
exist, and the expenses of the Reparation Commission in Paris and
those of the Office for Reparation Payments in Berlin. During
the first two and a half years these charges have amounted to
about 11% of the total disbursements, and approximately 89%
has represented distributions among the Powers. In the first and
second years, approximately 35% of the total disbursements has
been transferred by purchasing with reichsmarks, foreign curren
cies which are either remitted to the creditor Governments or are
paid out for their account. The remaining 65% was paid for de
liveries in kind and for expenses within Germany of the armies of
occupation, expenses of inter-allied commissions and such things.
For the current year these figures are not yet available.
Much the largest single item of transfers is that relating to
deliveries in kind. For instance, in both the first and the second
annuity years, the payments for deliveries in kind aggregated
rather more than one-half of the total disbursements for each
year, and for the six months of the third annuity year ending
February 28, 1927, deliveries in kind were almost exactly 50% of
the total disbursements.
Deliveries in kind fall into two groups, the first commonly
known as treaty deliveries, that is, deliveries of coal, dye stuffs
and chemicals which Germany is required by the Versailles
Treaty to deliver on reparation account and, secondly, other
deliveries which are made under voluntary contracts which closely
approximate ordinary commercial ones. Prior to the Dawes
Plan, the Allies called upon Germany for certain deliveries and in
so far as these demands were complied with, the German Govern
ment settled with its own nationals for the goods delivered. With
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the inauguration of the Dawes Plan, Germany was relieved of the
direct obligation to furnish goods; as has been pointed out, her
liability under the Plan is limited to the payment into the Reichs
bank of the specified annuities. Moreover, to protect the German
economy, it is stipulated in the London Agreement that the pro
grammes for deliveries in kind laid down by the Reparation Com
mission after consultation with the Transfer Committee, shall be
fixed “with due regard to the possibilities of production in
Germany, to the position of her supplies of raw materials and to
her domestic requirements in so far as is necessary for the main
tenance of her social and economic life and also with due regard to
the limitations set out in the Experts’ Report.” It is further
stipulated “That it (the German Government) will facilitate as
far as possible the execution of the programmes for all deliveries
under either the Treaty or the Experts’ Report by means of com
mercial contracts passed under ordinary commercial conditions;
and that, in particular, it will not take, nor allow to be taken, any
measure which would result in deliveries being unobtainable under
ordinary commercial conditions.”
Practically speaking, deliveries under commercial contracts are
a development under the Dawes Plan. The process is, briefly,
as follows: A German seller, in the ordinary course of his business,
approaches, say, a French buyer and they make a bargain because
they believe the transaction is mutually advantageous. Up to
this point there is nothing to distinguish the transaction and it is
a matter for agreement between the parties whether the contract
shall be carried out on reparation account or under ordinary com
mercial processes. The parties, however, let us assume, agree
that the transaction shall be carried out upon reparation account.
This means that copies of the contract are submitted to Reparation
officials in Paris, who, in turn, consult with a German Commission,
for the purpose of seeing that the class of goods and other details
fall within the provisions of the regulations which have been de
veloped under the Plan. The main object of this scrutiny is to
insure that the contract does not call for the delivery upon repara
tion account of more than the quantities specified in the regula
tions, of certain materials which must be imported into Germany
at a cost in foreign currency. Inasmuch as the regulations are
known to everyone, comparatively few contracts call for rejection
on this account. Another requirement which has to be observed
is that the total amount of such contracts for any Power shall not
408
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exceed the amount available to that Power on account of its share
at the time. Overdrafts are not allowed. Once a contract is
approved by the Reparation Commission Office, it is sent to the
Transfer Committee for consideration. The machinery works
promptly and quietly and when a contract is approved, the parties
proceed with its execution in the usual way. The contracts vary
in their terms regarding the time and manner of delivery and time
of payment. In some cases a contract may be completed in one
shipment, while in others the shipments extend over a period of
several months. Sometimes payment is to be made upon com
pletion of the contract, while in other cases an advance payment
is stipulated; frequently payments on account are required.
These things are arranged between the buyer and the seller before
the contract is signed. When a payment is due under a contract,
the Allied buyer, instead of going to his bank for a draft payable
to the German producer, goes to an authorized representative of
his Government from whom he secures a draft at five days’ sight
(although time drafts are used to a limited extent), payable to his
own order. He then endorses the draft and delivers it to the
German seller (or to his order) who, in turn, discounts it or de
posits the draft in his bank for collection, as he may choose. In
due course the draft is received by the Reichsbank in Berlin and it
presents the draft to the Agent General for acceptance and the
amount of the draft, when due, is paid by the Agent General to
the Reichsbank out of the annuity funds which are on deposit
there.
The regulations under which deliveries are made upon commer
cial contracts were put into effect on May 1, 1925. Considerable
progress was made in the development of this business between
that date and August 31st, the end of the first year. During the
second annuity year the practice grew and there were submitted
to the Transfer Committee 2,559 contracts with French buyers
and 1,091 with Belgian buyers. These two countries furnish the
bulk of the commercial contracts; Italy’s deliveries consist mostly
of coal, coke, dye stuffs and pharmaceutical products, while
Poland, Serbia, Rumania and the other minor Powers are still
taking deliveries under contracts which were made before the
Dawes Plan came into existence. Great Britain, outside her
army costs, receives her reparations in currency under the
Reparation Recovery Act, while in the case of the United States,
her army occupation costs are being liquidated by direct cash
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payments and her mixed claims are being paid under an agreement
which was arranged with certain German exporters to the United
States.
The goods covered by these commercial contracts comprise all
sorts of things necessary to supply economic wants: coal and a wide
variety of coal products, refractory products, fertilizers, chemicals,
iron and steel, machinery of all sorts, railway supplies, sugar,
textiles, horses, cattle and other animals. There were two large
contracts in the second year that were of special interest, one, a
contract for dredging of the Port of Havre, calling for an expendi
ture of nearly a million and a quarter of dollars, and the other, a
telephone cable contract for Belgium, costing nearly 900,000
dollars. In value, individual contracts range from millions of
marks down to a few thousand. A perusal of the reports of the
Agent General makes it evident that the deliveries in kind have
contributed directly and effectively to the restoration of the com
forts and conveniences of the war torn countries. The imagina
tion is touched by the record of such things as the deliveries to
Serbia of railway and street cars to a value of more than four
million dollars; agricultural, textile and other machinery of a
million and a quarter of dollars; mining, bridge building and
similar material of another million and a quarter; telephone and
telegraph apparatus of nine hundred thousand dollars; hospital
and medical supplies costing three hundred thousand dollars.
Rumania received locomotives, cars and rails amounting to more
than two million dollars, while Greece was assisted to meet its
refugee problem by the delivery to it on reparation account of
wooden houses costing three quarters of a million dollars.
The problems related to deliveries in kind have been the subject
of considerable speculation and discussion and their ultimate
effects cannot yet be measured. The Experts in their report
said:
“We have given special attention to the question of deliveries in kind:
in their financial effects, deliveries in kind are not really distinguishable
from cash payments, and they cannot in the long run exceed the true sur
plus of German production over consumption available for export without
either upsetting the exchange or rendering foreign loans necessary.”

Deliveries in kind were, however, provided for in the Treaty of
Versailles and were being made pursuant thereto when the Dawes
Plan went into effect. The Plan, therefore, did not originate the
practice but it had to deal with an existing arrangement. The
Experts recognized, moreover, that as a part of a going system,
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several of the Allied countries were dependent upon deliveries in
kind, and to stop them would cause dislocation. Furthermore,
they felt that within reasonable bounds, deliveries in kind might
represent a stimulus to German productivity. They might also
assist in making transfers. These hopes of the Experts appear to
have been well founded. Deliveries in kind have gone forward
with general satisfaction both in Germany and in the receiving
countries. Especially, it would seem that the system of deliver
ies under commercial contracts is helpful as a means of restoring
the channels of trade which had been broken up by the war.
Under these contracts the German producer deals with a buyer
whose credit is safe, while at the same time the purchaser secures
from his Government some incidental advantages by making his
purchase upon reparation account. German producers of a wide
range of products, are being brought again into contact with
Allied buyers. These recent antagonists are finding it possible to
do business together, and thus the fabric of international trade
which was torn asunder in the war, is, in part, being restored as an
incidental contribution to reparation payments.
The payments by Germany and the transfers to the creditor
Powers have been accomplished in the face of many real difficul
ties and of much hard work. Among other things, it was neces
sary to procure a protocol between Great Britain and Germany
regarding the Reparation Recovery Act and to negotiate an agree
ment with Germany providing for the liquidation, in the third
annuity year, of contingent liabilities which would have fallen,
with probably detrimental effects, into the fourth and fifth years.
However, goodwill and understanding on both sides have grown
month by month and these have made it possible to solve the
problems that have arisen in the past and this spirit constitutes
a bright promise for the success of the further operation of the
Plan.
Aside from its financial results, the Plan has marked a starting
point for, and has been a contributing factor in, the economic and
political stabilization of the western European countries which
has come since 1924. One marked effect which can be attributed
directly to the Plan, is the renewal in the German people of con
fidence in themselves and of hope for their future. The post-war
period not only destroyed the German currency and wrecked the
fortunes of vast masses, but it undermined the morale of the
people. So serious was this condition that it was generally ex
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pected that a long time must elapse before morale would be re
stored. Happily, this prediction has proved to be unfounded.
At the same time, the Plan made it possible for other nations,
particularly America, to make loans and extend credits to German
commerce and industry and thus supply the working capital
which was necessary to enable them to function. Indeed, for a
while American bankers were so eager to secure German loans
that sometimes it looked as though the life giving stream was
dangerously near to a flood stage. While the better class of
bankers arranged loans and credits with discretion and care,
others, in the early months of the Plan, rushed in with almost
childlike simplicity. Before 1924 few American bankers had
more than a limited experience in making foreign loans and it is
to be feared that most of them have followed too closely the
methods which had been developed in connection with domestic
loans. Sufficient care was not always taken to adapt American
methods to foreign conditions, and some good business has gone
to other centers because of the onerous and inflexible conditions
laid down by American bankers. Among other things, our cum
bersome and complicated form of legal documents, which few
laymen here have ever pretended to understand, is a good deal of
a shock to foreign business men who have perhaps an over
appreciation of the efficiency of our business methods and
practices.
Another highly significant development in Germany since 1924
has been the growth of an internal money market. In April,
1924, just about the date of the report of the First Committee of
Experts, the Reichsbank, in order to protect the currency, insti
tuted a strict rationing of credit. For months thereafter, the
credit situation was analogous to the food situation in a besieged
city where the inhabitants are allowed a quantity of food just
sufficient to sustain life. After the German External Loan was
floated, which provided a sound backing for the German cur
rency, the rationing policy was gradually relaxed but it was not
until near the end of 1925 that it became unnecessary. In the
autumn of 1924 during the early months of the Plan, money was
scarce and interest rates were high, the day to day rate being
16% in the middle of October and just under 11% at the end of
December. On current deposit accounts the banks at first paid
6% but reduced the rate to 5% about November, 1924. Savings
bank deposits and life insurance funds had been almost wholly
412

The Dawes Plan in Operation

destroyed by the inflation. To the surprise and gratification of
everyone, the savings banks began at once to show signs of life.
In spite of low wages and a small volume of business, the common
people manifested a gratifying degree of confidence in the new
reichsmark currency which was established under the Plan. That
picturesque and significant phrase, “The flight from the mark,”
was no longer heard. At the end of the first annuity year,
August 31, 1925, savings bank deposits were reported at 1,304
millions of reichsmarks and at the end of the second year they had
increased to 2,591 millions of reichsmarks. An interesting fact
in this connection is that while the total savings bank deposits in
Germany are, as yet, only about 16% of the pre-war deposits, the
annual increase, aside from interest allowed on deposits, which
before the war was of course a large item, is now greater than it
was in the years preceding the war. In 1925, interest rates con
tinued to fall, and short term money was reasonably plentiful,
partly because of the accumulation of savings and profits among
the German people themselves, and in larger part, no doubt,
because of the loans and credits from abroad. Throughout 1925
there were no public offerings in Germany of domestic security
issues, but in the early summer of 1926 offerings began to appear,
and the internal market developed astonishing resources. For
the whole year of 1926 the domestic issues in Germany amounted
to about 1,350 million reichsmarks as against about 1,700 million
reichsmarks of foreign loans; in other words, about 44% of the
total public issues of securities in Germany in 1926 were offered
upon, and absorbed by, the domestic market. In addition to
these issues there were sold over the counter, in accordance with
the usual practice, a large quantity of mortgage bonds, and
also a substantial amount of new issues of capital shares was
absorbed.
Had anyone in 1924 predicted the development within this
short time of such an internal money market in Germany, he
would have been dismissed as a visionary unworthy of credence.
Its existence is a fact, however, and a fact which has much sig
nificance for American bankers. It would only weary you, even
if time permitted, to refer to other developments within Germany,
such as the growth in the sales of the cooperatives, the reduction
of unemployment and the progress that has been made in the
reduction of costs and the increase of production that has grown
out of the widespread and intensive study that has been, and is
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still being given in Germany to problems of business organization
and processes of manufacture.
As we have already seen, the Experts Committee tried to pro
vide a sense of security that would permit the German economy
to proceed in its reconstruction in an orderly way. The German
people have responded to this appeal of the Plan and their success
has outrun expectations. The German people know that upon
the economic side, the Plan has been their salvation. Their cur
rency has been stabilized and the one external factor which might
disturb the stability of the currency, that is, reparation pay
ments, is under the control of the Transfer Committee which is
charged with the duty of safeguarding the currency. This Com
mittee, as we have seen, is clothed with broad powers. From my
intimate knowledge of the character and the courage of the men
who, as members of the Transfer Committee, are answerable to
their own consciences alone for their acts within the provisions of
the Plan, I know that they will not shirk their duty and that their
ability and foresight are the best assurance that crises will be
avoided.
Upon the political side, the Plan has also borne fruits of great
importance. Out of an atmosphere of bitterness and hatred
there has come a measure of peace and goodwill that is quite as
surprising as any of the financial results. This is not the time
nor the place to attempt to appraise the political situation be
tween Germany and her former enemies. It is enough to remind
you of the agreements that have been made during the past two
years and of those other projects such as the ones mentioned in
connection with Thoiry, which, in the interests of world welfare,
let us hope, are not dead but merely sleeping. If the policies
which were followed from the close of the war to 1924 were those
of destruction, the Dawes Plan can fairly claim to be a policy
founded upon justice which continues to be a contributing factor
in the growth of constructive policies outside of and beyond its
own field.
When we look to the future, we often hear around us the voices
of the prophets of gloom. Many, speaking in a doctrinaire
manner, are convinced that the Dawes Plan must break down—
they say there is no hope for it. Other observers are no less cer
tain that Germany can continue to pay and that the full annuities
can be successfully transferred. Both groups can not be right
and perhaps some misapprehension enters into the calculations
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of both. If the Dawes Plan was a final, rigid thing like a mort
gage, there might be more occasion for concern. The Plan, how
ever, is not an inflexible piece of mechanism fastened on the
back of the German Government. It must be remembered that
the annuities fixed by the Experts Committee had to be determined
at a time when financial and economic conditions in Europe,
and particularly in Germany, were much befogged. The Com
mittee had to make its forecasts under these difficult conditions
and to make these forecasts for a period of several years. With
out yielding in our admiration of what they accomplished, it
would not be surprising if it should be found experimentally that
some degree of error crept into their forecasts. They recognized
that possibility themselves and like wise men they took care to
guard against unhappy results in such an event. Moreover, and
this point seems to be overlooked by many, the Plan itself is not a
final settlement. In its report, the Experts Committee stated:
“ We would point out finally that while our plan does not, as it could
not properly, attempt a solution of the whole reparation problem, it fore
shadows a settlement extending in its application for a sufficient time to
restore confidence, and at the same time is so framed as to facilitate a
final and comprehensive agreement as to all the problems of reparation
and connected questions as soon as circumstances make this possible.”

Events are moving, the will to agree is growing, and it is not
unreasonable to hope that it will not be long until the final and
comprehensive agreement foreseen by the Experts Committee will
become a reality. The questions yet to be settled are delicate
and of a nature easily provocative of quarrels, but the problems
can be settled in a friendly way if approached in the right spirit.
The situation at present calls for patience and an effort to under
stand. In particular, there should be everywhere a restraint upon
criticism. Apparently with this thought in mind, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of France, M. Briand, was reported recently as
saying:
“ I do not understand why public opinion impatiently confuses inter
national politics with motion pictures, whose scenes must be reeled off at
high speed. What is significant is that, thanks to the confidence imposed
in Dr. Stresemann and myself by our countries, things have become pos
sible which two years ago would have seemed quite impossible.”

The future of reparations may be faced today with confidence, and
for the past, I know of no more satisfying tribute to the work of
the Experts Committee and to the administration of the Plan
than a statement in a Paris paper on February 12, 1927, which
was penned by M. Jacques Seydoux, who had then just retired
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from a long and honorable career in the French Government
service. He said:
“Thanks to it (the Dawes Plan), the question of reparations, which not
only aroused Germany against the Allies but involved the risk of embroil
ing the Allies among themselves at any moment, was taken out of the po
litical field and transferred to the domain of technique. The Germans
had such an interest in the restoration of their financial situation, and their
industrialists needed credit so badly, that they accepted without hesitation
the very severe clauses on control which the Plan contained. The fact is
that everybody did his bit, and that a general goodwill succeeded the great
est possible badwill; confidence replaced distrust, and for two and a half
years the Dawes Plan has been functioning without difficulty; differences
of opinion have been settled without trouble either directly or by arbitral
verdicts which everybody has accepted; Germany is enjoying a stable
currency and a financial prosperity which increases every day, while the
Allies are receiving what is due them.”
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